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I. INTRODUCTION 
The build-up of greenhouse gases released by human activities has 
already warmed the Earth’s atmosphere, melted glaciers, intensified 
extreme weather events, increased the geographic range of deadly 
diseases, and caused mass mortality events in ecosystems 
worldwide.1 However, predictions for the future are even bleaker.2 
 
 1. See Rafael Coma et al., Global Warming-Enhanced Stratification and Mass 
Mortality Events in the Mediterranean, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6176, 6176 
(2008) (illustrating the consequences of rising temperatures on marine ecosystems 
and the link between above-average water temperatures and the two largest mass 
mortality events in the Mediterranean); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Current Evidence of Climate Change, http://unfcc.int/ 
essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2904.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter UNFCCC Current Evidence] (highlighting specific instances of glacier 
melts in Greenland and Antarctica, droughts in Africa and floods in Europe, 
Africa, and Asia associated with climate change); see also U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Future Effects, http://unfcc.int/ 
essential_background/feeling_the_heat/items/2905.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter UNFCCC Future Effects] (predicting the expansion of regions acutely 
impacted by climate change, including shifting crop growth, and an increase in the 
range of diseases such as malaria). 
 2. See UNFCCC Future Effects, supra note 1 (projecting more than a 
doubling of the observed warming, and implying that the resulting climate change 
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Scientists predict that by 2030, 20 million people in Bangladesh 
alone will be displaced by land succumbing to rising sea levels.3 The 
Nobel Prize winning group, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (“IPCC”), predicts that by 2080, 33% of the world’s coastal 
wetlands will become open water.4 The IPCC also estimates that 
melting glaciers will raise global sea levels by up to two feet in the 
next century, consuming an area equal to the size of Massachusetts 
and Delaware combined.5 An increase in global temperatures by a 
mere 1.5 to 2.5˚C could result in the extinction of 30% of all plant 
and animal species, and the IPCC projects increases in the range of 
1.1 to 6.4˚C in the next 100 years.6 Extreme weather events ranging 
from heat waves to hurricanes are predicted to become more frequent 
and more intense.7  
Taking into account catastrophic forecasts and acknowledging the 
gravity of climate change, nations worldwide ratified the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 
which was adopted as an international legal framework for 
 
related impacts will be more severe than those that have occurred to date). 
 3. See Emily Wax, In Flood-Prone Bangladesh, a Future That Floats, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/09/26/AR2007092602582.html (reporting on the predicted 20 million 
Bengali “climate refugees” resulting from sea level rise and the opportunities for 
large boats as a potential solution). 
 4. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011) [hereinafter EPA Coastal Zones] (reporting that the IPCC found that 
increases in atmospheric temperatures will melt glaciers, resulting in vast 
quantities of water being released into the oceans); see also Press Release, 
Nobelprize.org, The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 (Oct. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Nobel 
Prize], available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/ laureates/2007/ 
press.html (crediting the award of a split Nobel Prize to IPCC due to the 
organization’s work in measuring the consequences of climate change). 
 5. See EPA Coastal Zones, supra note 4 (revealing that rising sea levels will 
swallow approximately 10,000 square miles of land nationwide). 
 6. See Findings of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 
Impacts, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (May 17, 2007), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/ucs-ipcc-wg2-72pi-
2007.pdf (summarizing the predicted impacts of climate change from the Fourth 
IPCC climate assessment, which incorporated input from 3,700 experts from 130 
countries). 
 7. See id. at 3 (expounding that weather events including heat waves, 
droughts, floods, and hurricanes are predicted to occur with greater frequency and 
intensity as climate change worsens). 
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responding to the threat of climate change.8 It calls on parties to 
strive to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic9 interference with the climate 
system.10 It also asks parties to reflect on whether their domestic 
policies promote emissions, and encourages international 
cooperation on measures to combat climate change.11 Because the 
UNFCCC charges parties with reducing their anthropogenic sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions, the emissions generated by the 
agricultural sector, particularly those by animal agriculture, fall 
within the purview of the UNFCCC’s commands.12 Thus, the United 
States should not continue to ignore the contribution of animal 
agriculture to domestic greenhouse gas emissions, and it should 
revisit its agricultural subsidies with a view to discouraging 
emissions.13 This is particularly true in light of the fact that animal 
agriculture is responsible for approximately 30% of the nation’s 
 
 8. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 
9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC] (laying out the objective of the 
UNFCCC as the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere); 
id. pmbl. (expressing collective concern that the increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases will enhance the warming of the Earth’s 
surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and 
humankind); see also CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GRP. III TO THE SECOND 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 69 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 1995] 
(highlighting the importance under the established framework of negotiations 
between countries to develop an international response to climate change). 
 9. “Anthropogenic” means “of, relating to, or resulting from the influence of 
human beings on nature.” Anthropogenic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary /anthropogenic (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011) [hereinafter Anthropogenic]. 
 10. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (outlining the objective of the UNFCCC 
as the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere in order to 
reduce the impact on ecosystems, food production, and economic development). 
 11. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 70 (analyzing the 
coordination among “economic and administrative instruments” and the support 
for scientific research on climate change that the UNFCCC requires). 
 12. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (naming the agricultural sector as a 
relevant sector for anthropogenic emissions reductions); see also discussion infra 
Part II.A (elaborating on the binding nature of the UNFCCC commitments). 
 13. See discussion infra Parts III-IV (arguing that, because subsidization of 
animal agriculture and the associated increase in greenhouse gas emissions is in 
contravention of UNFCCC commitments, the United States should reconsider its 
agricultural policies). 
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emissions of methane, a gas that has at least twenty-one times the 
global warming potential of carbon dioxide.14 With the latest climate 
conference culminating in an agreement that allows parties to 
continue to avoid legally binding emissions reductions until 2020,15 it 
is crucial that the United States reflect on and ameliorate policies in 
its agricultural sector.16 
This Comment argues that U.S. subsidization of animal agriculture 
violates Article 4 of the UNFCCC by promoting greenhouse gas 
emissions in contravention of its obligation to mitigate emissions. 
Part II explores the history and implications of the UNFCCC, as well 
 
 14. See CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 73 (underscoring that climate 
change measures should include the phasing out of distortionary policies, such as 
subsidies, that directly or indirectly increase greenhouse gas emissions); see also 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 
1990-2009, ES-5, 2-13 (Apr. 15, 2011) http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ 
downloads11/US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Complete_Report.pdf [hereinafter GHG 
Inventory] (reporting on the greenhouse gas emissions of various sources from the 
U.S. indicating agriculture contributes 196.8 of 686.3 Tg of CO2 equivalent 
methane, or 29%). 
 15. See Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Dec. 10, 2011, Draft Decision -
/CP.17, available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/ 
decisions/application/pdf/cop17_durbanplatform.pdf [hereinafter Durban 
Platform]; see also Fiona Harvey & John Vidal, Global Climate Change Treaty In 
Sight After Durban Breakthrough, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/11/global-climate-change-
treaty-durban (explaining that the terms of a legally binding agreement for 
UNFCCC parties to reduce their carbon emissions need to be agreed to by 2015, 
and that the terms will come into effect in 2020). 
 16. See U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Kyoto 
Protocol, (last visited Oct. 10, 2011), http://unfccc.int/kyoto _protocol/ 
items/2830.php [hereinafter Info. on Kyoto Protocol] (providing background 
information about the Kyoto Protocol, including discussion of a 5% reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions that the thirty-seven nations and the EU are bound to 
reach under the Protocol by the end of 2012 ); see also Cancún Agreement Rescues 
UN Credibility But Falls Short of Saving Planet, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/12/cancun-agreement-rescues-
un-credibility [hereinafter Cancún Agreement] (explaining that key countries such 
as Japan and Russia are unlikely to sign further binding emissions agreements 
without the U.S.’s commitment); see also Diva Rodriguez, Has COP16 put too 
Much Pressure on COP17?, CLIMATE ACTION (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.climateactionprogramme.org/news/has_cop16_put_too_much_pressure
_on_cop17/ (explaining that, although the Cancún Convention failed to resolve the 
future of the Kyoto Protocol, it restored some faith in the United Nations (“U.N.”) 
as a forum for dealing with climate change by pushing resolution of the issue onto 
the next COP). 
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as the significance of the Kyoto Protocol.17 Part II additionally 
discusses the role of animal agriculture in global warming and the 
ways in which animal agriculture is currently subsidized both 
directly and indirectly.18 Part III argues that U.S. subsidies on animal 
agriculture violate UNFCCC Article 4 pursuant to a textual analysis 
of the Convention, as well as by analogy with domestic law.19 Lastly, 
Part IV proposes a number of potential solutions that would bring the 
United States into compliance with the UNFCCC.20  
II. BACKGROUND 
Before it is possible to establish that the United States is in 
violation of the UNFCCC due to subsidizing animal agriculture, it is 
necessary to properly contextualize the issue. Subsection A of this 
Part will explain the legal framework involved, and will also 
introduce the Clean Air Act,21 a U.S. law to which the UNFCCC is 
compared in Part III.22 Subsection B will describe the relationship 
between animal agriculture and global climate change, and establish 
the scientific basis for animal agriculture’s considerable climate 
changing effect.23 Lastly, Subsection C will connect the earlier two 
sections by explaining the economic mechanisms that incentivize 
overproduction of animal food commodities, and, consequently, the 
 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–2 (introducing the commitments of the 
UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and subsequent agreements). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.B-C (describing the role of animal agriculture in 
climate change, as well as the role of agricultural subsidies in promoting animal 
agriculture). 
 19. See discussion infra Part III.A (showing that UNFCCC Article 4 requires 
the United States to reassess agricultural subsidies given their tendency to increase 
emissions). 
 20. See discussion infra Part IV (outlining potential solutions to the UNFCCC 
violations stemming from agricultural subsidies). 
 21. See generally Clean Air Act (Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act) §§ 
101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006) (establishing a framework for the 
reduction of air pollution in the United States). 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.A.1–3 (framing the argument that subsidies on 
animal agriculture frustrate the aims of the UNFCCC by introducing the 
requirements of the UNFCCC); see also discussion infra Part II.A.4 (introducing 
the Clean Air Act so that a meaningful analogy can be drawn with the UNFCCC to 
propel the argument that the UNFCCC is binding). 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.B (delineating the multiple ways that animal 
agriculture creates greenhouse gas emissions and explaining why the impact of its 
emissions are so high relative to other sectors). 
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emission of greenhouse gases that constitutes the violative 
behavior.24  
A. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR REGULATING 
CLIMATE CHANGE  
By the early 1990s, scientists had concluded that emissions of 
greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide 
were causing a gradual warming of the Earth’s atmosphere and that 
this phenomenon would have vast implications for the environment 
and humankind.25 In recognition of this, the UNFCCC was adopted 
and entered into force in March 1994.26 The objective of the 
UNFCCC is to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will 
prevent adverse environmental changes by curbing emissions from 
anthropogenic sources.27  
The core of the UNFCCC lies in Article 4, which consists of the 
“commitments” of the convention.28 While Article 4 uses binding 
language,29 the UNFCCC is often referred to as a “non-binding” 
 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.C (showing that economic incentives, such as 
subsidies, encourage production of subsidized goods, and that subsidies on animal 
agriculture thereby encourage greenhouse gas emissions). 
 25. See Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 316 (1998) 
(reporting that by 1990 the IPCC was certain that greenhouse gas emissions 
resulting from human activities were causing warming of the Earth’s atmosphere 
and predicting temperatures to increase one degree Celsius if greenhouse gases 
continued to be emitted in the same manner); see also ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 
Climate Change: Basic Information, http://epa.gov /climatechange/basicinfo.html 
(last updated Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter EPA, Climate Change: Basic 
Information] (outlining various causes and consequences of global warming, 
including sea level rise and the shifting of previously predictable events such as 
migration patterns and blooming schedules). 
 26. U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Status of 
Ratification of the Convention, http://unfccc.int/essential_ background/ 
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter Convention Ratification Status] (indicating the agreement came into 
force in 1994 upon the deposit of the 50th ratification instrument, and that there are 
currently 195 parties to the convention). 
 27. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (elucidating the aim of the UNFCCC as 
the stabilization of the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
without certain adverse impacts). 
 28. See generally id. art. 4 (enumerating the actions to which all parties to the 
UNFCCC commit). 
 29. See id. (binding the parties to the UNFCCC to develop inventories, adopt 
  
998 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
convention.30 This is because the UNFCCC does not concretely state 
a level by which parties must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
and there is no real enforcement mechanism for redressing 
violations.31 Instead, the most ardent requirement of the UNFCCC is 
that states adopt national policies to mitigate climate change with the 
“aim” of returning to 1990 emissions levels by 2000.32 Nevertheless, 
the UNFCCC requires parties to, at a minimum, assess policies that 
encourage emissions.33  
1. UNFCCC Article 4: Commitments  
The heart of the UNFCC is in Article 4, which contains the 
commitments. The commitments that are particularly relevant to this 
discussion require that parties (1) implement measures to mitigate 
climate change by addressing anthropogenic sources of emissions,34 
(2) promote practices and processes that reduce or prevent emissions, 
including from the agricultural sector,35 (3) promote sustainable 
 
policies to mitigate climate change, coordinate with other parties to meet the goals 
of the Convention, provide financial resources to developing nations, provide 
assistance in response to the impacts of climate change, and take steps to promote 
environmentally responsible technologies, among other requirements). 
 30. See, e.g., Tushar Mathur, UNFCCC Meets on Climate Change, TALKING 
ABOUT GREEN (Dec. 4, 2008), http://talkingaboutgreen .com/unfccc-meets-on-
climate-change (mentioning that, because the UNFCCC is a non-binding 
agreement, parties have since aimed towards establishing mandatory emissions 
limits). Interpreting the UNFCCC as binding is also consistent with readings by 
many scholars. See, e.g., Breidenich et al., supra note 25, at 317 (explaining that, 
under Article 4(1), parties are “obligated” to undertake measures to mitigate 
climate change and that Article 4(2) “requires” industrialized country parties to 
adopt policies that limit emissions of greenhouse gases). 
 31. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 14 (instructing that parties shall seek 
settlement of any dispute relating to the UNFCCC through negotiation). 
 32. See id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (declaring that UNFCCC parties commit to returning 
to 1990-levels of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions by 2000 and 
periodically report on the measures that they are taking to reach that goal). 
 33. See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE 1995, supra note 8, at 70 (asserting that the 
UNFCCC requires developed parties to review their policies to assess whether they 
encourage increased emissions and coordinate with other parties to meet the goals 
of the UNFCCC). 
 34. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (requiring the regular publishing 
and taking inventory of sources and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions). 
 35. See id. art. 4(1)(c) (compelling states to “promote and cooperate” in 
reducing and preventing emissions of greenhouse gases from the “energy, 
transport, industry, agriculture forestry and waste management sectors”). 
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management of sinks and reservoirs,36 (4) take climate change 
considerations into account in relevant social, economic, and 
environmental policies,37 (5) adopt policies to mitigate climate 
change by limiting emissions of greenhouse gases and by protecting 
sinks and reservoirs with the aim of returning to 1990 emissions 
levels by 2000,38 and (6) identify and review domestic policies which 
encourage increased emissions of greenhouse gases.39  
Relevant to interpreting the scope of these commitments are the 
principles delineated in Article 3, which instruct that parties “shall be 
guided by” certain considerations in implementing UNFCCC 
commitments.40 Particularly illustrative is the principle that measures 
adopted by the parties should promote sustainable economic growth 
for all parties to the convention, particularly for developing 
countries.41  
2. Kyoto Protocol and Subsequent Developments 
The Kyoto Protocol is a supplement to the UNFCCC that set 
 
 36. See id. art. 4(1)(d) (requiring states to maintain and enhance, where 
available, greenhouse gas sinks); see also id. art. 1 (defining a “sink” as “any 
process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” and a “reservoir” as “a 
component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a 
precurser of a greenhouse gas is stored”). 
 37. See Id. art. 4(1)(f) (mandating that parties consider climate change when 
implementing “social, economic and environmental policies” while minimizing the 
impact on the economy, public health and the environment). 
 38. See id. art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (setting a goal of reaching 1990 levels of emission 
by 2000 while providing regular reports on the steps taken to make that progress); 
see also U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data for the Period 1990-
2006, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBt/2008/12 (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Nat’l 
Greenhouse Data] (showing that the United States increased its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 14.4% between 1990 and 2006 while countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Germany decreased their emissions by 15.1% and 18.2% 
respectively). 
 39. See UNFCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(d)(ii) (requiring an assessment of the 
incremental greenhouse gas emissions resulting from policies and activities). 
 40. See id. art. 3 (including in the guiding principles factors such as 
consideration of the economic well-being of developing nation parties and 
promotion of an open and supportive international economic system). 
 41. See id. art. 3(5) (emphasizing that policies implemented by developed 
country parties should encourage the sustainable economic growth of developing 
nation parties). 
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binding emissions targets for the European Union and 37 other 
industrialized countries.42 Under the Kyoto Protocol, developed 
nation parties are required to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions 
to an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012.43 Among potential 
methods of reducing emissions, the Protocol proposes phasing out 
economic incentives and subsidies that encourage greenhouse gas 
emissions.44 One of the most significant facts about the Kyoto 
Protocol is that the United States never ratified it.45 The United States 
is currently the only industrialized nation to refuse to sign the Kyoto 
Protocol,46 and its refusal to do so is attributed to concerns about 
 
 42. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] 
(establishing a series of requirements for Annex I states to reach the objectives of 
the UNFCCC); see also Info. on Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16 (explaining that the 
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on February 16, 2005, was enacted to 
help achieve the objective of the UNFCCC by establishing mandatory emissions 
reductions targets); see also discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the importance 
of the Kyoto Protocol in analyzing UNFCCC obligations). “Annex I” Parties 
include the industrialized countries that were members of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992. Conversely, non-
Annex I parties are mostly developing countries. See Parties and Observers, U.N. 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfcc.int/parties_ 
and_observers/items?2704txt.php (last visited Oct. 10,2011) [hereinafter UNFCCC 
Parties and Observers] (providing the respective definitions for “Annex I,” “Annex 
II,” and “Non-Annex I,” and highlighting that Non-Annex I countries are generally 
those developing countries which are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects 
of climate change). 
 43. See Info. on Kyoto Protocol, supra note 16 (summarizing the requirements 
of the Annex I countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020) While 
the average reduction goal under the Kyoto Protocol is 5.2%, individual emissions 
targets vary. Had the United States adopted the Kyoto Protocol, it would have been 
bound to a 7% reduction while the U.K. is bound to an 8% reduction. Some 
countries are allowed to increase emissions by up to 8%. See Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 15, Annex B. 
 44. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2 (asserting that states are required 
to “implement and/or further elaborate” ways in which they are able to eliminate 
policies that encourage emissions and are counter to the UNFCCC). 
 45. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfcc.int/kyoto_ protocol/ 
status_of_ratification/items/2613txt.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter 
Kyoto Ratification Status] (listing the Protocol’s current signatories, indicating the 
United States has signed, but not ratified the Protocol); see also infra notes 48-49 
and accompanying text (discussing the political reasons for the U.S. failure to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol). 
 46.  See U.N. Climate Talks and Power Politics: It’s Not About the 
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competition with non-bound countries such as China and India.47 The 
United States fears that countries such as China and India, which 
were not classified as Annex I developed countries at the adoption of 
the UNFCCC but have since become primary emitters of greenhouse 
gases, would gain an unfair advantage in the global market due to 
their Kyoto Protocol exemptions.48 Because it refuses to ratify the 
treaty, the United States will not face any penalties for failure to 
meet what would have been its 7% Kyoto Protocol emissions 
reduction goal.49  
To date, the most tangible reduction commitment made by the 
United States is contained in the Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding 
agreement containing voluntary pledges to reduce emissions from 
heavy-emitting developed and developing nations.50 More recently, 
 
Temperature: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigation of the 
H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 13 (2011) (Statement of Todd Stern, 
Special Envoy for Climate Change) [hereinafter Climate Change Hearing] 
(indicating that the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, but in 2001 
announced that the US would not ratify the protocol). 
 47. See David E. Sanger, Bush Will Continue to Oppose Kyoto Pact on Global 
Warming, N.Y. TIMES June 12, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/12/world/ 
bush-will-continue-to-oppose-kyoto-pact-on-global-warming.html?pagewanted= 
all&src=pm (reporting on President Bush’s refusal to ratify the Protocol because of 
the treatment of two of the largest CO2 emitters, China and India); see also Rod 
McGuirk, Australia Signs Kyoto Protocol; U.S. Now Only Holdout NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS Dec. 3, 2007, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/new/pf/ 
83432535.html (reporting that, after Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the 
United States became the sole industrialized nation to refuse to ratify it). 
 48. See Sanger, supra note 47 (explaining that the U.S. wished to avoid 
undertaking emissions reduction commitments which might put it at a 
disadvantage in the global market); see also Tom Levitt, Carbon Emissions: The 
World in 2010, THE ECOLOGIST (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.theecologist.org/ 
News/news_analysis/383922/carbon_emissions_the_world_in_2010.html (noting 
that China’s gross domestic product increased by 250% between 1992 and 2006, 
that its CO2 emissions correspondingly rose by over 120%, and that, by 2020, non-
Annex I countries, such as China, India and Brazil, are expected to account for the 
majority of global emissions). 
 49. See Frequently Asked Questions, PBL NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT 
AGENCY, http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/climatechange /faqs#vraag8 (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter PBL] (showing that U.S. emissions have increased by 
13% since 1990, and, thus, that the United States did not meet its UNFCCC target). 
 50. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/C.7 [hereinafter 
Copenhagen Accord] (requiring parties to submit greenhouse gas emissions targets 
by Jan. 31, 2010); see also Alex Carr, UN Climate Conference (COP 16) Wrap up 
and What to Watch in 2011, ENVTL. LEADER (Dec. 20, 2010), 
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the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties produced the Cancún 
Agreements,51 which, although binding, sidestepped the reissuance of 
a new set of emissions targets.52 In late 2011, facing the imminent 
expiry of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.N. Conference of the Parties 
produced the Durban Platform, which, while binding on the United 
States, again defers the commitment to binding emissions targets to a 
later date.53 
3. Principles of Treaty Interpretation  
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna 
Convention”) is the result of a decades-long effort by the U.N. to 
codify customary international law on the law of treaties.54 Although 
 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2010/12/20/un-climate-conference-cop-16-
wrap-up-and-what-to-watch-in-2011/ (summarizing the key points from the 
Copenhagen Accord, such as a pledge by the United States to reduce emissions by 
17% from 2005 levels by 2020 and the development of provisions for the 
monitoring, reporting, and verification of the voluntary pledges, and inferring that 
the United States would prefer to adopt a new protocol that would bind China and 
India rather than extend the Kyoto Protocol, which leaves these countries exempt); 
Cheryl Pellerin, Copenhagen Accord Politically Significant but Not Legally 
Binding, AMERICA.GOV (Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.america.gov/st/energy 
english/%202009/December/20091222131726lcnirellep0.1802179.html 
(elucidating that the Copenhagen Accord resulted from informal negotiations 
between the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Mexico and 
twenty other nations and was thus not adopted as an official outcome of COP 15). 
 51. Cancun Agreements, Dec. 11, 2010, Decision -/CP.16, available at 
http://www.unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/ 
pdf/cop16_lca.pdf. 
 52. See Lucia Green-Weiskel, Climate Clash in Cancún, THE NATION (Dec. 16, 
2010),http://www.thenation.com/print/article/157156/climate-clash-
canc%C3%BAn (discussing that, although the parties agreed to a $100 million 
fund to help developing countries adapt to climate change, the parties skirted the 
pressing matter of renewing reduction commitments). 
 53. See Durban Platform, supra note 15, ¶¶ 2–4 (agreeing to “launch a process 
to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal 
force under the Convention applicable to all Parties,” to establish this legal 
instrument by 2015, and to have them come into effect from 2020); see also 
Harvey & Vidal, supra note 15 (reporting that the Durban Platform is an 
agreement to work on a new climate deal which will be binding on both developed 
and developing state parties, and unlike the Kyoto Protocol, was signed by the 
United States). 
 
 54. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] 
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the United States is not formally a party to the Vienna Convention,55 
the United States considers it to be an embodiment of customary 
international law,56 thereby making the Vienna Convention an 
appropriate guide for U.S. treaty interpretation.57 Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention contains the general rule of interpretation, 
instructing that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms in its context and in light of 
its object and purpose.58 It goes on to define “context” as including a 
treaty’s text, preambles and annexes, and any instruments made by 
one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty 
and is accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty.59 Context can also include any subsequent agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty, 
and any application of the treaty that reflects the consensus of the 
 
(providing the international legal framework governing treaties between states); 
see also Karl Zemanek, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Vienna, 23 May 
1969, U.N. (2008) http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html (explaining the 
impetus for codifying customary international law, and the near unanimous 
agreement that the treaty is an accurate codification of customary international 
law). 
 55.  See UNTC, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx? &src=TRE 
ATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en, (last updated 
Oct. 22, 2011) [hereinafter UNTC] (listing the United States as having signed the 
treaty on Apr. 24, 1970, but never having ratified the agreement). 
 56. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter STATE DEP’T] (considering “many provisions of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the 
law of treaties.”). 
 57. See MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 439–40, 448 (2009) (explaining that since 1969, there 
has been a growing consensus that Articles 31 and 32 are reflective of customary 
law); see also Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. 
Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431 (2004) (underscoring that, although 
the United States has not officially ratified the Vienna Convention, it can be used 
to analyze U.S. treaty obligations because it is a codification of customary 
international law); see also Zemanek, supra note 54, at 3 (noting that even the 
International Court of Justice refers to the Vienna Convention without examining 
whether a litigant is a party to it). 
 58. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 31(1) (establishing a “good 
faith” basis for interpreting the terms of a treaty according to the words’ ordinary 
meaning and by the context of the treaty). 
 59. See id. art. 31(2)(b) (construing context broadly by including “any 
instrument” in connection with the treaty and “accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty”). 
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parties.60 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows for recourse to 
“supplementary means of interpretation” in order to further support 
the meaning drawn out by interpretation of a treaty under the Article 
31 framework. “Supplementary means of interpretation” include 
agreements and practices among a subgroup of treaty parties that 
would not fall within the purview of Article 31, such as the Kyoto 
Protocol. Analysis of the terms and context of the UNFCCC in 
accordance with these principles will help elucidate the proper 
interpretation of the Article 4 Commitments in Part III.A.61  
4. The Clean Air Act 
 
Following the publication of Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking 
book Silent Spring in 1962,62 there was a new sense of urgency for 
dealing with increasingly evident environmental ills caused by 
human activity.63 In the wake of this growing environmental 
cognizance, the social climate was ripe for the passage of sweeping 
environmental statutes.64 In 1970, Congress enacted the first iteration 
 
 60. See id. art. 31(3)(a)-(b). Treaty interpretation through the lens of Article 31 
is appropriate only where all parties to a treaty accept the interpretation of treaty 
terms contained within qualifying “context.” See VILLIGER, supra note 57, at 429–
30. Thus, any elucidation of the meaning of the UNFCCC by the Kyoto Protocol, 
which the United States did not ratify, is appropriately viewed only through the 
framework of Article 32, which allows for supplementary means of treaty 
interpretation. Id. 
 61. See discussion infra Part III.A (applying the Vienna Convention principles 
to deduce that the UNFCCC is a binding instrument). 
 62. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 63. See Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY J. (Nov. 1985), 
http://wwww.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.html (last updated June 8, 2011) 
(explaining that Rachel Carson’s book, which documented the toll of pesticide use 
on bird populations, received nationwide attention and, consequently, paved the 
way for environmental reforms in the following decade). 
 64. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4347 (2006) (promoting the minimization of impacts on the environment); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6908a (2006) (intending to control the disposal of hazardous 
wastes); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006) (establishing 
the policy of Federal actions minimizing their impact on endangered species); 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1281a (2006) (attempting to “restore and maintain . . . [the] 
integrity of the Nation’s waters”); see also Lewis, supra note 63 (explaining that 
President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act on January 
1, 1970 to mark the beginning of an “environmental decade,” which would see a 
host of revolutionary environmental legislation). 
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of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), which was most recently amended in 
1990.65 The Clean Air Act was enacted to protect the public health by 
limiting the quality and amount of pollutant that individuals and 
companies are allowed to release into the air.66  
The CAA shares not only the UNFCCC’s goal of protecting 
human health and welfare through environmental regulation, but also 
is structured similarly to the UNFCCC.67 For example, the structure 
of the CAA is such that the enacting authority, the federal 
government, does not develop or enforce mandatory air quality 
standards.68 Under the framework of the CAA, the Environmental 
Protection Agency is responsible for establishing national air quality 
standards, non-enforceable guidelines that reflect the levels at which 
there is no known or anticipated adverse effect on the public health 
or welfare from a given pollutant.69 Another similarity between the 
 
 65. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (controlling the emissions of pollutants into 
the atmosphere); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIRTrends 1995 Summary: 
Background, http://epa.gov/airtrends/aqtrnd95/backgrnd.html (last visited Oct. 10, 
2011) [hereinafter AIRTrends] (acknowledging that air pollution causes health 
problems ranging from eye irritation to premature death, has profound impacts on 
the environment, and that the Clean Air Act was intended to combat these 
problems). 
 66. See § 7401(b)(1) (declaring that the purpose of the CAA is to promote the 
public health and welfare by enhancing the quality of the nation’s air); see also 
AIRTrends, supra note 65 (noting that the CAA mandated the establishment and 
enforcement of two types of air quality standards by the EPA to limit the air 
pollution which could be emitted from “stationary sources” such as factories and 
power plants). 
 67. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the impetus, 
purpose, and scope of the Clean Air Act). 
 68. Compare § 7401(b)(1) (declaring that the CAA’s purpose is to “protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health 
and welfare”), with UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 1(1) (aiming similarly to mitigate 
climate change enough to prevent any “deleterious effects on . . . human health or 
welfare.”). 
 69. See § 7409(a)(1)(A) (requiring that the EPA Administrator establish a 
“national primary ambient air quality standard” and a “national secondary ambient 
air quality standard” for each regulated air pollutant). National primary air quality 
standards are set at the level necessary to protect the public health with an adequate 
margin of safety. See id. § 7409(b)(1). National secondary air quality standards are 
those levels requisite to protect public welfare. See id. § 7409(b)(2). These 
standards do not consider technological or economic feasibility, and therefore 
represent a goal rather than a mandate. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 
531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding that the CAA unambiguously bars cost 
considerations in the setting of the air quality standards). 
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UNFCCC and the CAA is that both defer the development and 
execution of plans designed to achieve ambitious environmental 
standards to subsidiary parties.70 Overall, like the CAA, the 
UNFCCC provides a framework for addressing an environmental 
problem, but it does not create precise, enforceable standards.71 
The considerable structural and substantive similarities between 
the CAA and the UNFCCC help drive the argument that the 
UNFCCC is an instrument that creates non-discretionary obligations 
on the United States.72  
B. THE ROLE OF ANIMAL AGRICULTURE IN GLOBAL WARMING 
After accounting for indirect emissions, estimates suggest that 
agriculture is responsible for approximately 32% of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.73 A very significant share of this is 
 
 70. See § 7410(a)(1) (designating the responsibility of adopting plans for the 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of air quality standards to the 
states); see also UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 10 (establishing a subsidiary body for 
implementation of the UNFCCC); Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 
U.S. 246, 250 (1976) (relating that each state is given wide discretion in 
formulating its plan, and the EPA Administrator must approve a state-proposed 
plan if it meets certain minimum criteria). 
 71. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (commanding parties to aim for 
1990 level emissions by 2000, but not entailing any repercussions for failure to do 
so); see also Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 259 (explaining that “the Administrator 
must approve a plan that provides for attainment of the primary standards in three 
years even if attainment does not appear feasible,” thus signaling that even state 
plans that are unambiguously inadequate to achieve the national air quality 
standards will nevertheless be approved). An additional domestic environmental 
statute that that is enforceable but that does not create concrete standards is the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k 
(2006). Section 6902(b) states “Congress hereby declares it to be the national 
policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous 
waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible.” Id. § 6902(b). 
 72. See discussion infra Part III.D (reasoning that mandated compliance with 
the CAA shows by analogy that the UNFCCC should similarly be enforced within 
the U.S.). 
 73. See JESSICA BELLARBY ET AL., GREENPEACE, COOL FARMING: CLIMATE 
IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURE AND MIGRATION POTENTIAL 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/Global/usa/ 
report/2009/4/cool-farming-climate-impacts.pdf (noting that indirect sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions from animal agriculture includes farm machinery, 
transportation, agrochemicals, and deforestation); see also U.N. Food & Agric. 
Org., Livestock a major threat to environment (Nov. 29, 2006), 
http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/ news/2006/1000448/index.html (highlighting 
  
2012] STANDING BEHIND BEASTLY EMISSIONS 1007 
attributable to animal agriculture.74 On its own, animal agriculture is 
responsible for approximately 18%75 of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, making it a larger contributor than the entire 
transportation sector.76 These figures comport with findings that the 
livestock sector expands over a staggering 40-50% of the Earth’s 
surface, and close to 50% of the continental United States.77 
 
the significant, and growing impact of agriculture, specifically livestock, to climate 
change inducing emissions). 
 74. See BELLARBY ET AL., supra note 73, at 8 (indicating that animal farming is 
associated with 60% of global methane emissions, the largest single contributor). 
 75. Although animal agriculture comprised only 9% of carbon dioxide 
emissions, the 18% figure is expressed in “carbon dioxide equivalent.” See KEITH 
PAUSTIAN ET AL., AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION, PEW 
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2006). Because carbon dioxide, methane, 
and nitrous oxide have different “global warming potentials” (“GWP”), or 
warming effect on a per mass basis, carbon dioxide is assigned a value of 1, and 
the relative effect of other greenhouse gases are expressed relative to that value. 
Methane has a GWP of 21 (making it 21 times more potent than carbon dioxide) 
and nitrous oxide has a GWP of 310. See id. (explaining the concept of GWP and 
the relative GWPs of the three main greenhouse gases). 
 76. See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32948, AIR 
QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A PRIMER 41 (2010) (highlighting 
the split of agricultural sector greenhouse gas emissions between animal and 
agricultural activity); see also HENNING STEINFIELD ET AL., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG., LIVSTOCK’S LONG SHADOW: ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 112 
(2006) (elucidating that, after accounting for the greenhouse gases emitted by 
enteric fermentation, manure management, fertilizer production, biomass burning, 
operation of farm machinery, and irrigation, animal agriculture accounts for 18% 
of total greenhouse gas emissions in carbon dioxide equivalent); see also Livestock 
a major threat to environment, supra note 73 (summarizing findings by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization that animal agriculture is not only a 
chief contributor of greenhouse gas emissions, but also its rapid growth makes it an 
especially potent source); see also World GHG Emissions Flow Chart, WORLD 
RES. INST., http://cait. wri.org/figures.php?page=World-FlowChart&view=100 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011) [hereinafter WRI] (quantifying the input and output of 
greenhouse gasses in the world, including 13.5% from transportation). 
 77. See BELLARBY ET AL., supra note 73, at 5 (emphasizing the large 
contributions of the agricultural sector to greenhouse gas emissions and the 
potential for the agricultural sector to become a greenhouse gas sink if different 
practices were adopted widely. See generally PETE SMITH ET AL., Agriculture, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION (Kristin Rypdal & Mukiri wa Githendu eds., 
2007) (quantifying the coverage of agricultural lands at 40-50% of the earth and 
highlighting management practices that would allow for an overall reduced impact 
of agricultural emissions); UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., Land Use, Value, and 
Management, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/LandUse/ (last visited Oct. 26, 
2011) [hereinafter USDA] (indicating that 46% of the surface of the United States 
is covered by agricultural lands and that the Federal Government is often used to 
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Greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector have been 
increasing annually, largely driven by increased methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions—the principal byproducts of animal agriculture.78 In 
fact, livestock production is responsible for more than 30% of the 
United States’ emissions of methane, a gas that has 21 times the 
global warming potential of carbon dioxide.79  
With the global demand for meat and dairy set to double by 2050, 
the climate change implications are daunting.80 In spite of these 
dangers, the animal agriculture sector enjoys widespread exemptions 
from federal and state environmental laws,81 even with government 
acknowledgement that methane and nitrous oxide threaten public 
health and welfare.82 To date, regulatory efforts concerning the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions have largely ignored the 
agricultural sector; instead they have focused on the industrial and 
transportation sectors.83 In light of the significant role of animal 
 
resolve conflicts with other potential land uses). 
 78. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 499 (suggesting that the 
disproportionate increase of methane and nitrous oxide relative to other greenhouse 
gases points to animal agriculture as the chief source of increasing emissions); id. 
at 503 (indicating that N2O and CH4 are the main non-CO2 greenhouse gas 
emissions from agriculture). 
 79. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 22 (breaking down the contribution of 
different sectors to domestic methane emissions, including 34.2% from 
agriculture); supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of 
“global warming potential” and the significantly higher warming potential of 
methane relative to carbon dioxide). 
 80. See FOOD ETHICS COUNCIL, MEAT CONSUMPTION: TRENDS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2001) [hereinafter FEC] (citing U.N. statistics 
that estimate that a growing population and rising global incomes will double the 
2000-level meat demand by 2050). 
 81. See Copeland, supra note 76, at 7 (noting that the Clean Water Act exempts 
most agricultural operations); see also id. at 19 (discussing that in December 2008, 
the EPA finalized an exemption of animal agriculture operations from mandatory 
reporting requirements for releases of hazardous substances into the air from 
animal wastes). 
 82. See id. at 23 (reporting that the EPA Administrator found current 
concentrations of methane and nitrous oxide, along with the other greenhouse 
gasses, to threaten public health and welfare). Where programs aimed at 
encouraging more environmentally sound farming practices do exist, participation 
is only voluntary. See RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33898, 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND 
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 16 (2009) (detailing some of the new voluntary 
environmental measures enacted in the 2008 Farm Bill, discussed in Part II.C.1). 
 83. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 238 (revealing that country 
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agriculture in greenhouse gas emissions, the increasing demand for 
animal food products, and the current lack of regulatory oversight, it 
follows that the animal agriculture sector provides one of the most 
promising opportunities for U.S. emissions reductions.84 
C. U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AND THEIR ROLE IN 
PROMOTING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS  
 
Agricultural subsidies85 promote increased production of animal 
food products in various ways.86 First, they may offer direct price 
support or production incentives.87 Second, they reduce operational 
costs by decreasing the price of necessary resources, allowing 
otherwise unprofitable farms to stay in business.88 Subsidized crop 
insurance and other safety nets create incentives for farmers to 
expand production.89 Last, the externalization of the environmental 
 
emissions reports submitted to the UNFCCC show that mitigation efforts focus on 
non-agricultural sectors); see also JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 25 (reiterating that 
current legislative proposals have not encompassed the agricultural sector). 
 84. See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., Global Climate Change, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., 
(last updated June 2, 2011), http://www.ers.usda.gov/ briefing/globalclimate/ 
[hereinafter ERS] (recognizing that agriculture “has a potential role to play in 
reducing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide”). 
 85. “Agricultural subsidies” for the purposes of this comment refers to direct 
subsidies on meat and dairy, as well as those on grains or water that reduce the 
costs of animal production. Cf. Subsidy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary/subsidy?show=0&t=1319679427 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (defining a subsidy as “a grant by a government to a 
private person or company to assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the 
public”). 
 86. See DENNIS OLSON, INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY TRADE AND 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM, BELOW-COST FEED CROP: AN INDIRECT 
SUBSIDY FOR INDUSTRY, (2006), available at http://www.iatp.org/ 
files/258_2_88122_0.pdf (arguing that subsidies on animal agriculture have led to 
overproduction, low prices for commodities, and growing market concentration); 
see also STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 227 (suggesting the possibility of a 
causal link between government subsidies on animal agriculture and natural 
resource degradation). 
 87. See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing various ways that livestock and 
dairy production is directly subsidized). 
 88. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 86, at 1 (discussing the indirect subsidy 
bestowed upon industrial animal producers by agricultural subsidies which reduce 
the price of animal feed). 
 89. See C. Edwin Young et al., Production and Price Impacts of U.S. Crop 
Insurance Programs, 83 AM. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. 1196, 1197-98 (2001) (explaining 
  
1010 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
costs of animal agriculture provides an additional subsidy.90 Critics 
of farm support programs assert that subsidies distort production and 
encourage concentration of production, comparatively harming 
smaller producers and farmers in foreign nations.91 These 
distortionary subsidies largely exist because of the immense political 
power wielded by the agricultural sector.92  
 
that there is an incentive for farmers to expand production after obtaining crop 
insurance). 
 90. The “externalities” of animal agriculture are the costs of its impacts which 
are external to the producers or markets for animal food products which are borne 
by society at large. Animal agriculture causes degradation of natural resources 
such as water, soil, and air and to wildlife biodiversity and human health, but these 
costs are not reflected in market prices. Instead, the costs of removing microbial 
pathogens, pesticides, or nitrates which leech from animal wastes into the water 
supply are subsidized by society’s utility bills, taxes, and health care expenses. A 
conservative figure for livestock’s externalized cost on the public is $713.6-$738.7 
million a year. See generally Erin M. Tegtmeier & Michael D. Duffy, External 
Costs of Agricultural Production in the United States, 2 INT’L J. OF AGRIC. 
SUSTAINABILITY 1 (2004) (exploring the economic and environmental costs of 
agricultural subsidies). Many environmental costs of animal agriculture are 
externalized because individual economic decisions usually only consider private 
costs and benefits. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 223 (asserting that 
there is a market failure in agriculture where producers act solely in their self-
interest). 
 91. See DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 41317, FARM SAFETY 
NET PROGRAMS: ISSUES FOR THE NEXT FARM BILL 18 (2010) (discussing the 
unintended consequences of U.S. agricultural subsidies on farmers in developing 
nations because the costs of production are distorted by the subsidy). 
 92. See, e.g., RALPH M. CHITE & DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 34036, DAIRY POLICY AND THE 2008 FARM BILL 9 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 
FARM BILL] (showing that the shift to mandated product price support for dairy 
was facilitated by the largest dairy trade association, the National Milk Producers 
Federation); see also SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 18 (stating that policymakers 
representing dairy, along with other major commodities, have shaped subsidy 
programs from their inception); see also Jesse Ratcliffe, Comment, A Small Step 
Forward: Environmental Protection Provisions in the 2002 Farm Bill, 30 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 637 (2003) (2003) (observing that the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002 is one of many sequential federal laws that protect 
American farmers at the expense of the environment); see also Daniel A. Sumner, 
The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Agricultural Subsidies Program, 
LIBRARY OF ECON. AND LIBERTY (2008), available at http://www.econlib.org/ 
library/enc/agriculturalsubsidyprograms.html (explaining that vegetables receive 
minimal government support relative to “grains, oilseeds, cotton, sugar and dairy 
products”). 
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1. Direct Subsidies and Farm Safety Nets  
Currently, the federal mechanism for regulating agriculture is the 
Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (“2008 Farm Bill”).93 
The 2008 Farm Bill provides direct support to the animal agriculture 
industry through price support measures, commodity programs, risk 
management programs, and disaster assistance programs.94  
The dairy industry, for instance, received direct payments totaling 
$994 million in 2009.95 The dairy industry also benefits from 
government-backed price support, which protects farmers from 
decreases in revenue caused by seasonal fluctuations in supply and 
demand that otherwise can put farmers out of business.96 In addition 
to price support, incentive programs provide bonus payments to U.S. 
dairy exporters, and conversely, assess taxes on all imported dairy 
products.97 Critics of these programs contend that they are simply 
taxpayer-financed income transfers to agricultural producers.98 Even 
dairy groups have expressed concern that dairy price support 
programs ultimately hurt the dairy industry.99 
 
 93. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–246, 122 
Stat. 1651 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Act]. 
 94. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 1-2 (outlining the three basic parts of the 
farm safety net framework in the 2008 act: commodity programs, risk management 
programs, and supplemental disaster assistance). 
 95. See id. at 9. The United States has notified the WTO that the aggregate 
measure of its support for the dairy price support program is more than $4.8 billion 
annually. These programs are classified “amber box” by the WTO, representing 
the most trade-distorting category of subsidies. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 
92, at 10; United States Dairy Program Subsidies, EWG Farm Subsidy Database, 
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000& 
progcode=dairy&page=conc&yr=2009&regionname=theUnitedStates (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter EWG Farm Subsidy] (indicating the top twenty percent 
of applicants received nearly sixty percent of the dairy subsidies in 2009). 
 96. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 7-9 (explaining that the USDA 
removed 115 million pounds of nonfat dry milk from the market in 2008 to 
insulate declining milk prices). 
 97. See id. at 13-15 (noting that, while the Dairy Export Incentive Program was 
developed to offset foreign dairy subsidies, it later became a market development 
measure, and that dairy importers currently pay 7.5¢ per unit). 
 98. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 5-6 (summarizing critics’ concerns over the 
burden on taxpayers as well as the potential to inflate agricultural land prices); see 
also Chris Edwards, Ten Reasons to Cut Farm Subsidies, CATO INST. (June 28, 
2007), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8459 (echoing the sentiment 
that farm subsidies merely transfer the earnings of taxpaying families to farms). 
 99. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (stating that some producers 
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Farmers also benefit from safety net provisions such as subsidized 
crop insurance. Federal crop insurance is an important farm risk 
management tool with exceedingly vast reach.100 Crop insurance 
programs have expanded in recent years101 despite assertions that 
government subsidization of crop insurance encourages the 
expansion of crop production onto sensitive lands.102 Livestock 
specific programs indemnify ranchers for livestock mortalities 
caused by disaster and assist ranchers who graze livestock on 
drought-affected land.103 Other programs reimburse livestock 
producers for feed losses caused by natural disasters.104 In yet 
another program, the “Milk Income Loss Contract,”105 some farmers 
 
argue that price support artificially stimulates milk production, causing persistent 
surpluses and depressed prices). 
 100. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 9 (noting the program’s widespread 
popularity due to it covering a “substantial portion of the farmer’s crop insurance 
premium” paid by the federal government). 
 101. See id. at 9 (noting the growing importance in federal crop insurance 
subsidies); see also id. at 13 (listing insurance programs new to the 2008 Farm 
Bill, covering drought and disaster damages); Young et al., supra note 89, at 1197 
(relaying that in 1999 and 2000, insurance premium subsidies increased, which 
reduced farmers’ costs for catastrophic damage insurance coverage). 
 102.  See id. at 10 (summarizing the concerns raised by critics who claim that 
subsidization through insurance distorts the crop market, encouraging the 
production of crops in sensitive marginal lands). 
 103. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, Fact 
Sheet, Livestock Indemnity Program, (Feb. 2011), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/ 
Internet/FSA_File/lip09.pdf [hereinafter LIP Fact Sheet] (explaining the eligibility, 
scope and coverage of the Livestock Indemnity Program, including annual 
coverage of $100,000); UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, 
Fact Sheet, Livestock Forage Disaster Program, (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/lfp_2011_pfs.pdf [hereinafter LFDP 
Fact Sheet] (summarizing the provisions of the Livestock Forage Disaster 
Program, including the per head recovery rate based on animal type and size); see 
RALPH M. CHITE & DENNIS A. SHIELDS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 21212, 
AGRICULTURAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE 4, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Agric. Disaster 
Assistance] (elaborating on the coverage of additional insurance programs, such as 
the “Livestock Indemnity Program” and the “Livestock Forage Disaster Program,” 
which subsidize livestock producers). 
 104. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 6 (discussing the 
insulation of farmers from the impact of variations in feed grain yield through the 
“Livestock Compensation Program” which paid producers of livestock in disaster 
areas). 
 105.  See generally Fact Sheet, Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) Program, 
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/milc2011.pdf [hereinafter MILC Fact 
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are eligible for federal payments whenever the market price for milk 
falls below a certain rate.106 Some legislators fear that this sort of 
program results in overly generous payouts to producers because 
compensation is triggered at levels of revenue loss that can be 
explained by normal variation in crop yields.107  
Other safety nets include disaster assistance programs, under 
which farmers can receive “catastrophic coverage” without paying a 
premium, and indemnity payments guaranteed by crop insurance.108 
Producers in natural disaster areas can receive supplemental 
payments for crop losses and obtain emergency disaster loans at 
below-market interest rates.109 In addition to these subsidies, other 
programs encourage the production of animal food products.110 In 
sum, these subsidies have fostered the long-term decline in the price 
of grains, which has, in turn, helped keep the price of animal 
 
Sheet] (detailing the provisions of the MILC program, which compensates milk 
producers when milk prices fall). 
 106. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 3 (explaining that, from Oct. 1 2008 
to Aug. 1, 2012, farmers are eligible to receive 45% of the difference in the market 
rate of milk and the prices established by the statute). 
 107. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 8-9 (summarizing the 
concerns of critics relating to the low trigger for the assistance, which could be 
triggered by typical yield changes from year to year and result in windfalls to the 
farmers). 
 108. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM SERV. AGENCY, Fact Sheet, 
Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program for 2009 and Subsequent Years, 
(Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet /FSA_File/nap09.pdf [hereinafter 
NAP Fact Sheet] (describing the disaster crop loss coverage provided to crops that 
would not otherwise qualify for federally subsidized insurance); Agric. Disaster 
Assistance, supra note 103, at 2 (revealing that these premiums are fully 
subsidized, and noting that this provision is triggered by a loss in actual or planned 
crop acreage). 
 109. See Agric. Disaster Assistance, supra note 103, at 3, 8 (explaining that 
producers may be eligible for low-interest emergency disaster loans for up to 100% 
of actual production). 
 110. See Michael Moss, While Warning About Fat, U.S. Pushes Cheese Sales, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11 
/07/us/07fat.html?_r=1&pagewanted (noting that the USDA launched an anti-
obesity campaign discouraging the overconsumption of fatty foods while investing 
$140 million per year into promoting cheese consumption, despite government 
data showing that cheese is a major contributor to the high fat content of the 
average American diet); see also Who We Are – Cattlemen’s Beef Board, 
http://www.beefboard.org/about/whoweare.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter Cattlemen’s Beef Board] (describing the involvement of the USDA in 
the Cattlemen’s Beef Board, which was created to stimulate the sale of beef). 
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products artificially low, stimulating animal product consumption 
and production.111 
2. Indirect Subsidies  
In 2009, the federal government allocated nearly $4 billion to corn 
producers,112 $1.72 billion to soybean producers,113 and $270 million 
to sorghum producers.114 Because a majority of these grains are used 
as feed for livestock, these commodity support programs indirectly 
subsidize animal agriculture.115 Financially, it is industrial factory 
farms that benefit the most from indirect subsidies because they 
receive a reduction of around 15% on their most significant operating 
cost—feed.116 Given that feed accounts for 50-65% of these farms’ 
operating costs, this price reduction translates to a savings of $3.6 
billion a year.117 
Another major operational cost in animal production is water; this 
too is a resource that is heavily subsidized for the animal agriculture 
sector.118 Any subsidy that artificially decreases the price of animal 
 
 111. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 12 (explaining the effect of a 
steady decrease in grain prices since the 1950s as an increase in livestock 
production and an associated increase in demand for feed). 
 112. See United States Corn Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, 
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=corn (last visited Oct. 
28, 2011) [hereinafter US Corn Subsidies] (indicating that the $3.78 billion in corn 
subsidies was nearly evenly split between direct payments and insurance premium 
subsidies). 
 113. See United States Sorghum Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, 
http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode= sorghum (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter US Sorghum Subsidies] (reporting a split more heavily 
weighted towards insurance premium subsidies over direct payments) 
 114. See United States Soybean Subsidies, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING 
GROUP,http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=soybean (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter US Soybean Subsidies] (relaying the split to 
favor direct payments more heavily than crop insurance subsidies). 
 115. See OLSON, supra note 86, at 1 (stating that 60% of the corn and 47% of the 
soy grown in the United States is used for animal feed). 
 116. See id. at 1-2 (highlighting the findings of the USDA which assert that feed 
accounts for 60-64% of poultry and egg operating costs, 17% for beef, and 47% for 
hogs). 
 117. See id. at 1 (criticizing the extent of discount conferred upon industrial 
animal producers by federal subsidy programs, and noting the 7-10% potential 
increase in price of animal produce if farmers were paid a fair amount for feed 
crops). 
 118. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 245 (highlighting that farmers 
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food products is significant because meat consumption has been 
shown to be “elastic,”119 meaning that its consumption falls with 
increasing prices.120 Thus, the fact that the real price of livestock has 
fallen in the modern era helps explain the corresponding increase in 
consumption.121  
3. Economic State of the Agricultural Sector 
While subsidies are presumed to be necessary to the operation of 
the agricultural sector,122 economic analyses suggest that farmers 
would not be subjected to serious additional losses as a result of 
subsidy reform.123 Rather, these studies reveal that the industry 
 
receive a subsidy from the under-pricing of water, with rates as low as .03% of the 
household consumer price); see also Tegtmeier & Duffy, supra note 95, at 5-6 
(exploring the cost of externalization of water degradation from livestock 
production, including treatment of pathogens, nitrates, and pesticides in public 
water supplies, which is estimated to cost $118.6 million). 
 119. “Elasticity” is defined as “the responsiveness of a dependent economic 
variable to changes in influencing factors.” Elasticity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elasticity (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Elasticity]. 
 120. See Craig A. Gallet, Meat Meets Meta: A Quantitative Review of the Price 
Elasticity of Meat, 92 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 258, 260, 268 (2010) (finding, via a 
meta-analysis, that meat consumption is “elastic,” with a median elasticity of -.869 
for beef, such that its consumption would be expected to decrease with increases in 
price); cf. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases 
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 
1238, 1238 (2008) (remarking that increases in corn price produced by biofuel 
demands had the affect of depressing demand for meat). 
 121. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 231-32 (suggesting that the 
removal of price distortions on resources used in animal agriculture would curb 
overall consumption); see also Mark Bittman, Rethinking the Meat Guzzler, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/27/ 
bittman.html (describing the growing global demand for meat as production costs 
decrease and global average incomes increase). 
 122. See Elizabeth Becker, Raising Farm Subsidies, U.S. Widens International 
Rift, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2002, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2002/06/15/international/europe/15FARM.html (acknowledging the 
viewpoint that farm subsidies are necessary to keep U.S. agriculture competitive 
globally, despite the opposition of various foreign governments). 
 123. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 98 (arguing that countries that repealed 
agricultural subsidies, such as New Zealand, consequently had stronger 
agricultural sectors, thus deducing that the United States could benefit from New 
Zealand’s model); See generally, David Harris & Allan Rae, Agricultural Policy 
Reform and Industry Adjustment in Australia and New Zealand, AGECON SEARCH, 
(June 6, 2004), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/ 15762/1/cp04ha01.pdf 
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already operates at a loss, and subsidies merely allow an 
unsustainable system to continue operating.124 The production of 
U.S. upland cotton125 is a good example. It would not be profitable to 
produce cotton in the United States without subsidies.126 However, 
due to generous subsidies, the United States remains the leading 
exporter of cotton.127  
The impact of biofuel subsidies on land usage demonstrates that an 
increase in the demand for a product leads to an increase in its 
production.128 The federal government funneled close to $6 billion to 
biofuel producers in 2009 in an effort to promote corn-based 
ethanol.129 This led to a 30% increase in the demand for corn, 
culminating in the expansion of corn production into non-traditional 
crop areas.130  
III.ANALYSIS 
As described in Part II.A, the UNFCCC mandates that its parties 
 
(highlighting the reforms made to agricultural policy in Australia and New Zealand 
towards free trade and the remaining programs available to assist farmers in 
adjusting to those changes). 
 124. See OLSON, supra note 86, at 3 (opposing agricultural subsidies because 
farmer incomes have declined by 16.5% despite the tripling of government subsidy 
payments between 1996-2001). 
 125.  Upland Cotton, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/upland%20cotton (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (defining 
upland cotton as “a widely cultivated American cotton plant . . . having short- to 
medium-staple fibers”). 
 126. Joseph Stiglitz, The Tyranny of King Cotton, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2006), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/2006/oct/24/stig/ (concluding that the 
$3-$4 billion in cotton subsidies provided to the cotton industry are keeping the 
industry afloat). 
 127. See id. (using cotton subsidies to show that subsidies in developed 
countries harm developing countries by increasing overall output and lowering 
overall prices). 
 128. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 19 (indicating that the nearly $6 billion in 
subsidies paid to corn producers for the promotion of biofuel manufacture in 2009 
increased the land area used for corn production). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. This example merely serves to highlight that subsidization leads to 
overproduction, not to argue that biofuels are deleterious to the environment. See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EIB BULL. NO. 79, THE 
ETHANOL DECADE: AN EXPANSION OF U.S. CORN PRODUCTION, 2000-09 (2011) 
(discussing how corn-based ethanol production affected land-use decisions made 
by farmers). 
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reflect on policies that may be encouraging emissions, as well as 
“aim” to mitigate climate change by implementing a range of 
domestic measures.131 An examination of the core commitments 
enumerated in Article 4 of the UNFCCC, keeping in mind Article 3’s 
guiding principles, demonstrates that the UNFCCC is a binding 
convention that can be breached even though it lacks both concrete 
emissions targets and enforcement mechanisms.132 Domestic 
environmental statutes also demonstrate, by analogy, that it is not 
unprecedented or uncommon to have binding laws that lack exact 
commitment levels and defer enforcement to other authorities.133  
A. EXAMINATION OF THE UNFCCC REVEALS THAT ITS ARTICLE 4 
COMMITMENTS ARE BINDING 
 
As discussed in Part II.A.3, the Vienna Convention is widely 
acknowledged as applicable to treaty interpretation for the United 
States despite lack of ratification by the United States.134 The Vienna 
Convention does not require that the text of a treaty be unclear or in 
dispute for external contextual materials to be rendered appropriate 
for interpretation.135  
 
 131. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (requiring parties to adopt 
national policies designed to mitigate climate change to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels). 
 132. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54, arts. 31, 32 (outlining the 
requirements for authentic treaty interpretation and supplementary means of 
interpretation, respectively); see also discussion infra Part III.A (showing that the 
language and context of the UNFCCC indicate the binding nature of the 
Convention). 
 133. See discussion infra Part III.D (comparing the UNFCCC to the Clean Air 
Act). 
 134. See Vienna Convention, supra note 54; see also Criddle, supra note 60, at 
435 (explaining that the Convention has served as an authoritative guide to treaty 
law for the executive and legislative branches despite its non-ratified status). But 
see id. at 447, 449 (noting that although U.S. courts regularly apply Articles 31 
through 33 of the Vienna Convention, “the Supreme Court has never relied upon 
the Vienna Convention as an authoritative source of law.”). 
 135. See Criddle, supra note 57, at 440 (pointing to the low threshold for 
triggering Article 32 analysis utilizing a treaty’s ancillary materials); see also id. 
(asserting that the committee charged with drafting the Vienna Convention itself 
considered a treaty’s contextual analysis “accumulative, not consecutive,” thus 
highlighting that outside materials can be analyzed in tandem with the text itself, 
and not exclusively after dispute about the meaning of the text arises). 
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Before addressing the substantive violations of the UNFCCC 
commitments that derive from the U.S. subsidization of animal 
agriculture, it is necessary to establish that the UNFCCC is a binding 
treaty that can be violated. A textual analysis of the UNFCCC 
reveals both explicit and implicit evidence of the convention’s 
binding nature. Most saliently, Article 4 is titled “Commitments.”136 
The fact that all of the actions delineated in Article 4 fall under this 
title is the first indication that parties are committed to undertake the 
actions outlined therein.137  
In addition, Article 4(1) begins with the command that all parties 
“shall” engage in the enumerated list of activities in an effort to 
mitigate climate change.138 Given the lofty objective of the 
UNFCCC, to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at a level that will 
not cause dangerous interference with the climate, it is unlikely that 
the UNFCCC was intended to be powerless.139  
Further evidence that the UNFCCC is binding is the fixed goal for 
parties to reduce their emissions.140 It would be curious indeed to set 
a target date for actions that were neither required nor expected to 
take place.141 Additionally, the designation of 1990 emissions levels 
 
 136. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4. 
 137. See Commitment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/commitment (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (defining 
“commitment” as “an agreement or pledge to do something in the future,” or “the 
state or instance of being obligated”). 
 138. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1); see also Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 
U.S. 146, 146 (2001) (recognizing that “shall” is the language of command); Shall, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “shall” as “[h]as a duty 
to; more broadly, is required to” and adding that “[t]his is the mandatory sense that 
drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold.”); Shall, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2011) (indicating that “shall” expresses mandatory action when used 
in laws or directives). 
 139. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (endeavoring to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in recognition of the fact that a failure to do so 
will cause “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”). The 
objective outlined in Article 2 of the UNFCCC is relevant to this analysis because 
the first general rule of treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention explains that 
the textual meaning is to be construed “in the light of its object and purpose.” See 
Vienna Convention, supra note 54, art. 31(1). 
 140. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (instructing that parties are to 
aim to return to 1990 level greenhouse gas emissions by 2000). 
 141. Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (finding the 
explicit articulation of a deadline as dispositive as to whether compliance was 
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as the standard for reduction by 2000 does not comport with the idea 
that compliance with the UNFCCC is optional.142 Thus, although the 
emissions reduction requirement defined in the UNFCCC is loose, 
this imprecision is not a valid justification for disregarding the 
UNFCCC’s mandates entirely.143 
Less overt yet nevertheless telling evidence that the UNFCCC is 
binding lies in Article 4(2)(g) of the UNFCCC.144 According to this 
provision, any non-Annex I party may elect to be bound to reducing 
its emissions to its 1990 level.145 That the UNFCCC gives non-bound 
countries the discretion to bind themselves to the UNFCCC 
commitments is significant for a few reasons. First, by allowing non-
Annex I parties to opt into the obligations enshrined in Article 
4(2)(a)-(b), the text implies that Annex I parties are bound to the 
provision by default.146 Second, by explicitly using the word 
“bound,” it verifies that Annex I parties are, in fact, under an 
obligation to adhere to Article 4 commitments, as are those non-
Annex I countries that choose to bind themselves.147 Third, it 
showcases the relative weight of the UNFCCC mandates on 
developing countries versus Annex I developed countries, and 
thereby reveals that U.S. compliance with the UNFCCC is subject to 
the utmost scrutiny because the United States is an Annex I 
country.148  
 
required). 
 142. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(a)-(b); see also discussion infra Part 
III.D (demonstrating that imprecise requirements in U.S. environmental statutes 
have not rendered them optional). 
 143. See infra notes 196-223 and accompanying text (showing that having an 
exact standard is not required to uphold environmental statutes within the United 
States). 
 144. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(g). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. Annex I countries, which are the subjects of the commitments 
housed in Article 4(2) of the UNFCCC, are not offered the choice of binding 
themselves to those commitments because they must comply with the terms 
already. Non-Annex I countries, however, are not automatically bound to Article 
4(2), and therefore may elect to undertake those additional obligations. By 
reserving this discretion exclusively to non-Annex I nations, the UNFCCC text 
shows that Annex I countries are by default bound to its terms. 
 147. See id.; see also Bind, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/bind (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (defining the verb “bind” as 
“to put under an obligation,” or “to constrain with legal authority.”). 
 148. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(g); see also id. art. 4(2)(a) (affirming 
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Similarly, Article 4(6) affords a certain degree of flexibility in the 
implementation of Article 4 commitments to parties whose countries 
are undergoing a transition to a market economy.149 By giving 
leniency concerning implementation exclusively to countries 
undergoing an economic transformation, Article 4(6) shows that 
developed country parties, such as the United States, are required to 
strictly abide by the UNFCCC commitments.150 It would not be 
necessary to allow “flexibility” for any party if the entire treaty were 
in fact non-binding.151  
A final provision that demonstrates that the UNFCCC is binding is 
Article 25, which allows for “withdrawal” from the UNFCCC 
subject to a few conditions.152 Withdrawal from a treaty that does not 
demand or expect compliance is unnecessary and therefore would 
not be anticipated by UNFCCC drafters intending a non-binding 
body of commitments. Taken together, these articles of the UNFCCC 
make clear that Article 4 commitments are binding and possible to 
violate.  
 
B. SUBSIDIES ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE VIOLATE UNFCCC  
ARTICLE 4(1)  
 
1. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) Violation 
 
The first UNFCCC article subject to U.S. violation due to 
agricultural subsidies is Article 4(1)(b), which requires that parties 
implement and regularly update programs containing measures to 
mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases.153 The ordinary meaning of the text of Article 
 
that the UNFCCC Annex I countries must take the lead in reducing emissions and 
acting in accordance with UNFCCC objectives). 
 149. See id. art. 4(6). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Cf. supra note 146 (explaining the implications of explicitly distinguishing 
between the obligations of types of parties). 
 152. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 25. 
 153. Article 4(1)(b) indicates that it requires compliance by using the word 
“shall.” Compare UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (directing that parties 
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4(1)(b) indicates that parties must implement or update national 
programs containing measures to mitigate man-made sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions.154  
Because the 2008 Farm Bill, which governs the allocation of 
agricultural subsidies, is a national program containing measures 
intended to mitigate climate change, the United States is required to 
update the program in light of evidence which unambiguously 
demonstrates the extent of animal agriculture’s contribution to total 
greenhouse gas emissions.155  
The Kyoto Protocol demonstrates its awareness that mitigation 
measures required under the UNFCCC will need to include 
reductions in the animal agriculture sector, where it suggests 
reducing methane emissions by improving waste management.156 
Especially noteworthy, though, is Article 2(1)(a)(v) of the Kyoto 
Protocol, which urges parties to phase out any fiscal incentive or 
subsidy that has the effect of increasing greenhouse gas emissions.157 
 
“shall” perform various duties where commitments are intended to be binding), 
with id. art. 15(1) (granting discretionary authority to propose amendments by 
using the word “may”), and id. art. 17(1) (imparting further discretionary authority 
to create protocols to the UNFCCC by using the word “may”), and id. art 25(1) 
(using the word “may” to give parties discretion to withdraw from the UNFCCC). 
See supra note 138 and accompanying text (contrasting this mandatory language 
with language that points to discretionary authority). 
 154. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (explicitly ordering parties to 
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national . . . programmes 
containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic 
emissions . . . ”); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining the 
significance of the use of the word “shall”). 
 155. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(b) (instructing that parties must 
regularly update national programs containing measures to combat climate change 
by addressing anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gas emissions); see also 
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34696, THE 2008 FARM BILL: 
MAJOR PROVISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 155 (2008) (showing that the 
“Global Climate Change Prevention Act of 1990” was extended through fiscal year 
2012 by the 2008 Farm Bill); see also discussion supra Part II.B (summarizing the 
environmental tolls of animal agriculture). 
 156. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(viii) (explicitly referencing 
“waste management” as an area through which methane emissions could be 
reduced); see also SMITH ET AL., supra note 83, at 506, 510 (explaining the 
relationship between animal waste and emissions, and how manure management 
can be improved to address emissions). 
 157. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(v) (promoting the reduction 
or removal of “fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all 
greenhouse gas emitting sectors . . .” to lower parties’ emissions levels). 
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These excerpts explicitly reveal the UNFCCC parties’ sensitivity to 
the potential need for the repeal or reassessment of distortionary 
agricultural subsidies that inadvertently encourage greenhouse gas 
emissions. While these specific provisions of the Kyoto Protocol are, 
of course, not enforceable against the United States, they do support 
the interpretation that, at a minimum, UNFCCC Article 4(1)(b) 
requires that the United States reevaluate and update its emission-
encouraging agricultural policies158  
The fact that the Farm Bill has repeatedly been extended and that 
there are no signs of its imminent revision give rise to an Article 
4(1)(b) violation.159 Serious revision of the economic policies 
incentivizing climate change within the Farm Bill is necessary to 
overcome the Article 4(1)(b) violation.160  
 
 
2. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c) Violation 
 
Another article that shows the United States’ reluctance to abide 
by the UNFCCC is Article 4(1)(c).161 Under this article, parties are 
required to promote the development of practices and processes that 
reduce or prevent emissions of greenhouse gases in all relevant areas, 
 
 158. See discussion supra Part II.B (revealing the toll animal agriculture exacts 
on the environment). 
 159. See discussion supra Part II.C (linking certain agricultural subsidies to 
increased demand for emission-heavy animal food commodities). Additionally, 
Article 4(2)(d) and Article 4(2)(e) together require that parties to the UNFCCC 
review domestic policies and practices that encourage anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases at regular intervals until the objective of the Convention is met. 
See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(2)(d)-(e). This provision unequivocally 
reiterates the mandatory nature of reassessing domestic policies that directly or 
indirectly contribute to increased greenhouse gas emissions. This too shows that 
compliance with the UNFCCC was not intended to be optional because the 
provision creates an ongoing obligation that cannot be abandoned until the goal is 
attained. See id. 
 160. See discussion infra Part IV.A (discussing in more detail the potential 
courses of action the United States could take to address the current UNFCCC 
violations). 
 161. See UNFCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (calling for parties to “[p]romote . . . 
practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases,” including in the agricultural sector). 
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including agriculture.162 It is worth mentioning that the obligation 
enumerated here is an affirmative one, and it, therefore, is not 
facially at odds with the United States’ laissez-faire stance 
concerning current agricultural subsidization.163  
Nevertheless, this Article remains significant. It explicitly 
references emissions from the agricultural sector, dispelling any 
doubt that the agricultural sector is within the domain of the 
UNFCCC’s control.164 Under this article, the United States is clearly 
required to “promote” the development of practices and processes 
that reduce or prevent emissions of greenhouse gases in 
agriculture.165 What is unclear from the UNFCCC language alone, 
however, is the extent to which parties are required to “promote” 
emissions-reducing practices and processes in agriculture, and 
whether a mandate to “promote” certain practices or processes 
encompasses its implementation. The concrete mandate of this 
provision is ambiguous because it simultaneously uses mandatory 
language and the broadly defined word “promote” as the operative 
verb. Because mere “promotion” of processes or practices to reduce 
or prevent greenhouse gases may not necessitate implementation, 
and thereby lead to an interpretation that nearly nullifies the intent of 
provision, supplementary means of interpretation are warranted for 
UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c). While subsidies may not represent a 
failure to promote practices or processes that reduce emissions, they 
do represent an unambiguous failure to implement appropriate 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. An affirmative duty is “[a] duty to take a positive step to do something,” 
and can thus only be violated by an agent’s failure to do something. Duty, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, considering only the plain 
meaning of Article 4(1)(c), the U.S. must fail to take any measures to promote 
practices and processes designed to control greenhouse gas emissions to fail in the 
duty outlined in the Article. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c). Although the 
continued promotion of animal agriculture cannot be violative of this article when 
the word “promote” is taken at face value, the Kyoto Protocol identifies a way to 
refine its meaning and thereby highlights how agricultural subsidies are generally 
problematic. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(1)(a)(v)-(vi); see also 
UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c). 
 164. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c) (stating that parties shall promote 
the development of practices and processes that reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
“in all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, 
forestry and waste management sectors”). 
 165. UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c). 
  
1024 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [27:4 
reforms within the agricultural sector.166  
 
3. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(d) Violation 
 
An additional UNFCCC article that points to the problematic 
nature of U.S. agricultural subsidies is Article 4(1)(d).167 Under this 
article, the United States is required to preserve greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs such as forests.168 Therefore, by actively encouraging 
the expansion of agricultural lands through subsidized crop insurance 
and other federal agricultural incentives, and consequently 
encouraging the destruction of greenhouse gas sinks and 
reservoirs,169 the United States is in violation of Article (4)(1)(d).170  
4. UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f) Violation 
 
Article 4(1)(f) instructs parties to take climate change 
considerations into account in relevant social, economic and 
environmental policies and actions.171 The plain language of this 
article suggests that the United States is violating the UNFCCC.172 
 
 166. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(c); see also discussion supra Part II.B 
(reminding that most attempts to control greenhouse gas emissions overlook the 
agricultural sector). 
 167. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d). 
 168. See id. art. 4(1)(d) (indicating that parties are required to “promote 
sustainable management . . . of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases…”); 
see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (elaborating on the role of 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs in curbing climate change). 
 169. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d) (requiring parties to promote sinks 
and reservoirs, indicating that destruction of sinks and reservoirs is a violation). 
 170. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(d). The United States is encouraging 
the destruction of sinks and reservoirs by significantly financing animal production 
operations that require vast amounts of land and encroach upon forests and other 
greenhouse gas sinks. See STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 32 (explaining that 
the advent of grain-feeding livestock in North America “has greatly increased the 
arable land requirements of livestock production…to about 34% of total arable 
land today.”); see also supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (illustrating 
that increased corn demand leads to expanding agricultural land areas). 
 171. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(f). 
 172. Because Article 4(1)(f) asks that parties “[t]ake climate change 
considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, 
economic and environmental policies and actions . . . with a view to minimizing 
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Given that the Farm Bill subsidizes an industry that contributes so 
significantly to climate change,173 it cannot be said that the Farm Bill 
seriously takes climate change considerations into account.  
The continued subsidization of animal agriculture violates an 
additional dimension of Article 4(1)(f) that mandates parties to 
employ appropriate means to minimize adverse effects on the 
economy.174 Language elsewhere in the UNFCCC demonstrates that 
“economy” does not refer solely to domestic economies, but rather 
refers to the global economy.175 The UNFCCC repeatedly stresses the 
importance of the consideration, by developed countries, of the 
economic impact of their policies on developing nation parties to the 
UNFCCC.176 This is particularly apparent in Article 3(5) of the 
UNFCCC, which stipulates that parties to the Convention must try to 
promote an international economic system that promotes economic 
growth for developing country parties.177 This shows that the United 
States is violating UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f) in two ways: first, by 
failing to take established climate change considerations into account 
 
adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality of the 
environment . . . ,” the refusal of the U.S. government to revise the 2008 Farm Bill 
with environmental considerations in mind is a facial violation of the UNFCCC. 
See id.; see also discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (expanding on the Farm Bill’s 
promotion of greenhouse gas emissions, and highlighting that the Farm Bill is a 
relevant economic policy pursuant to UNFCCC Article 4(1)(f)). 
 173. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C. Moreover, the U.S. government 
acknowledges the extent of greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and yet 
continues to grant various allowances for pollution. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 
77, at 503 (revealing that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”) gives estimates of animal agriculture’s contribution to methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions at 47% and 58%, respectively); see also ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, Methane: Sources and Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/methane/ 
sources.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2011) (demonstrating that the EPA is aware 
that livestock production is a significant source of methane emissions); supra note 
86 and accompanying text (showing that the government continues to grant various 
exemptions from environmental requirements in spite of its awareness of animal 
agriculture’s noxious climate-warming effect). 
 174. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(f) (asking parties to “[t]ake climate 
change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their relevant social, 
economic and environmental policies and actions . . .”). 
 175. See, e.g., id. pmbl., arts. 3(2), 3(5), 4(7), 4(9). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. art. 3(5) (stipulating additionally that parties’ measures to combat 
climate change “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”). 
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in existing economic policies, such as the Farm Bill, and second, by 
neglecting the economic consequences of U.S. agricultural subsidies 
on developing nation parties to the UNFCCC.178  
While a full analysis of the international trade implications of U.S. 
agricultural subsidies is outside the scope of this Comment, this point 
bears some elaboration because the duty of Annex I countries to 
foster the economic growth of developing country parties is 
reiterated repeatedly in both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.179 
Developing countries object to the heavy subsidization of the U.S. 
agricultural sector because the inundation of artificially low-priced 
agricultural goods produced in the United States into world markets 
prevents developing countries from being competitive.180 The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) echoes these concerns about U.S. 
agricultural subsidies.181 Recently, Brazil challenged U.S. cotton 
subsidies in the WTO, where the subsidies were denounced for 
distorting trade and unfairly impinging on Brazil’s cotton exports.182 
The United States paid Brazil $147.3 million in fines in lieu of 
 
 178. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (showing the various ways 
that the U.S. continues to subsidize the animal agriculture industry); see also supra 
note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the trade implications of cotton 
subsidies). 
 179. See, Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, art. 2(3) (requiring that parties included 
in Annex I strive to implement policies in a way that will minimize adverse 
economic effects on developing country parties); UNFCCC, supra note 8, pmbl. 
(affirming that the parties’ responses to climate change should take into account 
developing countries’ need to achieve sustained economic growth and to eradicate 
poverty). 
 180. See Gumisai Mutume, Mounting Opposition to Northern Farm Subsidies, 
17 AFR. RECOVERY 18 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev 
/geninfo/afrec/vol17no1/171agri4.htm (reporting that U.S. cotton subsidies have 
threatened the continued existence of communities in countries like Burkina Faso, 
where communities depend on cotton trade for survival and producers are 
increasingly unable to compete with the cheap cotton produced in the United 
States); see also Becker, supra note 122 (summarizing the dispute between 
developing countries and the United States with regard to agricultural subsidies in 
the aftermath of the extension of the Farm Bill in 2002). 
 181. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining that the WTO has 
classified U.S. dairy subsidies as “amber box” because they belong to the most 
trade-distorting category of domestic subsidies). 
 182. See WORLD TRADE ORG., Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267, United 
States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (detailing the 
dispute surrounding the subsidization of U.S. upland cotton, which constituted 
significant price suppression and “serious prejudice to the interests of Brazil”). 
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repealing the cotton subsidies.183 Evidence suggests that all major 
subsidized crops in the United States are potentially vulnerable to 
dispute settlement challenges pursuant to the WTO agreements.184 
This demonstrates that, like cotton subsidies, U.S. subsidies on 
animal agriculture do not foster the economic growth of developing 
countries; therefore these subsidies are contrary to UNFCCC Article 
4(1)(f).185 
C. SUBSIDIES ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE VIOLATE UNFCCC 
ARTICLE 4(2)(A)-(B) 
 
What is likely the most demanding, and certainly most widely 
recognized, formal requirement of the UNFCCC is housed in Article 
4(2)(b), which requires the United States and other Annex I countries 
to aim to reach 1990 emissions levels by 2000.186 The ordinary 
meaning of the text suggests that, despite the lack of concrete 
binding emissions levels, signatories are required to aim to meet their 
respective 1990 emissions levels.187 The broad and lofty goals of the 
 
 183. See Sewell Chan, U.S. and Brazil Reach Agreement on Cotton Dispute, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink 
?index=0&sid=5&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=3&sta (discussing how an 
agreement was reached after Brazil planned to impose $830 million in WTO-
authorized sanctions on the U.S.); 
see also Mark Drajem, Brazil, U.S. Agree to Avoid Tariffs in Dispute on Cotton 
Trade, Kirk Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
print/201004-06/u-s-to-suspend-export-credit-program-in-bid-to-end-brazil-trade-
dispute-html (reporting the outcome of the Brazil-U.S. WTO dispute, and 
showcasing that there is a growing need for Congressional review of farm 
subsidies). 
 184. See SHIELDS, supra note 91, at 21 (warning that other agricultural subsidies 
are likely as susceptible to WTO challenges as were the cotton subsidies). See 
generally RANDY SCHNEPF & JASPER WOMACH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
33697, POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. FARM SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO (2007) 
(discussing the vulnerability of U.S. agricultural programs to WTO settlement 
challenges). 
 185. See 2008 FARM BILL, supra note 92, at 10 (explaining that the WTO 
considers some of the U.S. animal agriculture related subsidies to be of the most 
trade-distorting variety). 
 186. See id. art. 4(2)(b). 
 187. The use of the word “shall” in Article 4(2)(a)-(b) conveys that the 
commands contained in those provisions are not intended to be voluntary. See id., 
art. 4(2)(a)-(b) (prefacing the obligation to aim to reduce emissions to 1990 levels 
with the word “shall”); see also supra note 153 and accompanying text 
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UNFCCC signatories similarly highlight that the continued 
promotion of a practice that contributes to 18% of global greenhouse 
gas emissions vis-à-vis agricultural subsidies is far from consistent 
with the UNFCCC mandates.188 
As shown above, there are numerous indicators within the text of 
the UNFCCC to suggest that the UNFCCC envisioned for its parties 
to be bound to Article 4, however imprecise the standard.189 
Language from the Kyoto Protocol further reinforces that UNFCCC 
drafters anticipated that mitigation measures would be focused on 
reforms of relevant economic policies, including the removal of 
subsidies that inadvertently encourage emissions.190 It also suggests 
that the drafters expected that the policies and practices of the 
agricultural sector, in particular, would ultimately need to be 
ameliorated.191 
D. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT SHOWS THAT 
INTERPRETING THE UNFCCC AS BINDING AS IT APPLIES TO THE 
UNITED STATES IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
Though an interpretation of the UNFCCC that rests a violation on 
a failure to aim to meet a standard may seem dubious, such an 
interpretation is not incongruous with existing law, and is instead 
supported by analogous domestic environmental statutes.192 A salient 
example of such a statute is the Clean Air Act (CAA).193  
 
(contrasting the mandatory and permissive language used within different articles 
of the UNFCCC). 
 188. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (calling for the “stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”); see also 
discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (showing the effect of animal agriculture on 
emissions and the effect of agricultural subsidies on promoting animal agriculture). 
 189. See discussion supra Part III.A (pointing to various provisions within the 
UNFCCC which indicate that it was intended to be a binding instrument). 
 190. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 42, arts. 2(1)(a)(iii), 2(1)(a)(v)-(vi). 
 191. See id. (encouraging, explicitly, that parties reduce or remove subsidies and 
encourage reforms in the agricultural sector). 
 192. See discussion infra Part III.D (demonstrating the structural similarity of 
the UNFCCC to a binding U.S. environmental statute). 
 193. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006); see also discussion supra Part II.A.4 
(introducing the objective of the CAA, as well as its structural similarities to the 
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Like the UNFCCC, the CAA suffers from the fact that the statute 
itself does not create precise, enforceable air quality standards.194 In 
fact, the CAA was challenged on the basis of lacking an “intelligible 
principle” to guide the EPA’s exercise of authority in setting the 
national air quality standards.195 However, the Supreme Court 
recognized that it had previously never required that statutes quantify 
exactly how much harm is too much, and thus upheld the CAA.196 It 
follows from this decision that, in the context of determining U.S. 
treaty obligations under the UNFCCC, the integrity of the 
Convention should not be undermined by its failure to provide a 
“determinate criterion” for what level of greenhouse gas emissions is 
appropriate.197  
In another case, the Supreme Court held that the EPA was required 
to continue to regulate carbon dioxide emissions even where its 
emissions-regulating authority overlapped with that of another 
executive agency.198 Thus, even when another authority lawfully 
executed one of the EPA’s Clean Air Act duties, the EPA was still 
not entitled to forgo its responsibilities.199 Likewise, the UNFCCC 
cannot continue to go unenforced even if an ancillary instrument, 
like the Kyoto Protocol, appears to be filling the regulatory void left 
by the UNFCCC.200  
 
UNFCCC, which supports drawing an analogy to the UNFCCC). 
 194. See § 7407(a) (explaining that the CAA is implemented by individual 
states, which develop their own plans for meeting national air quality goals). 
 195. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) 
(describing the procedural history of the case to frame the ultimate reversal of the 
Court of Appeals’ decision that the CAA lacked an “intelligible principle” and thus 
violated the Constitution’s non-delegation doctrine). 
 196. See id. at 475-76 (holding that there was no unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power to the EPA despite the breadth of the CAA and its minimal 
guidance on setting national air standards). 
 197. See id. (citing Am. Trucking Ass’n., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 175 
F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999)) (overturning the Court of Appeals’ decision because a 
precise standard or a “determinate criterion” is not necessary to make the CAA 
enforceable). 
 198. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 531-32 (2007) 
(holding that, although the Department of Transportation had authority to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles, the EPA was also required to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions because the EPA’s statutory obligation to 
promote public health is wholly independent of the Department of Transportation’s 
mandate to promote energy efficiency). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Cf. id. at 531-32 (suggesting that one authority’s original responsibility 
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That the CAA is enforceable despite its structural similarity to the 
UNFCCC is visible from the countless and frequent cases against 
violators of the CAA.201 Especially worthy of note is that, although 
the enforcement authority of the CAA is almost entirely transferred 
to the states,202 the cases are often brought jointly by local 
governments and the Federal government. Also noteworthy is that 
the EPA’s disapproval of deficient state implementation plans has 
been upheld.203 This means that the EPA has authority to sanction 
states for inadequate adherence to the CAA even if the EPA is not 
able to directly enforce compliance with the national air quality 
standards.204  
Given the UNFCCC’s similarity to established and potent 
domestic law, it follows that the UNFCCC must be binding and that 
U.S. economic policies promoting greenhouse gas emissions are 
violative of it.205 By analogy, the CAA suggests that, while UNFCCC 
parties cannot be sanctioned for failure to reduce their emissions to 
1990-levels, parties can be sanctioned for their failure to try.206  
 
continues, even where another authority possesses and acts on overlapping 
authority). 
 201. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Compliance and Enforcement, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/newsroom/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2011) (displaying 
the last 100 cases of successful enforcement of CAA claims since April 19, 2011). 
 202. See § 7407(a) (relinquishing enforcement authority to the states, thereby 
paralleling the structure of the UNFCCC); see also, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
Cement Manufacturer to Pay $1.4 Million for Clean Air Act Violations, (Feb. 10, 
2011), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/ab2d81eb0%2088f4a7e85257359003f53
39/268868a4634671da85257833006c3b41 (showing that the EPA, the Department 
of Justice, and Ohio state authorities jointly secured a $1.4 million settlement with 
a cement manufacturer and these proceeds are to be distributed to the U.S. 
government, the State of Ohio, and Ohio’s affected counties). 
 203. See Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 880 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding the 
EPA’s disapproval of Virginia’s state implementation plan for failing to comply 
with the CAA where it did not incorporate certain required provisions). 
 204. See id. (underscoring that the federal government retains authority to 
induce state action through sanctions). 
 205. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (elaborating on the tendency of 
agricultural subsidies to increase demand for production of subsidized 
commodities, and discussing how the production of animal food commodities 
contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, and how increasing demand exacerbates 
the environmental consequences). 
 206. See generally id. (showing that under the CAA, noncompliance can be 
sanctioned by the EPA, the central authority, even though that authority is unable 
to enforce specific air quality standards). 
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IV.RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE IDEAL SOLUTION: ELIMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSIDIES  
 
The elimination of subsidies that currently incentivize the 
overproduction of animal food commodities is the ideal solution to 
the UNFCCC violations discussed herein. This is because the United 
States cannot continue to encourage practices that are demonstrably 
contributing to global climate change while also being in compliance 
with the Convention.207 Due to the unpopularity of advocating for a 
decrease in consumption of animal food products despite the clear 
link between their production and greenhouse gas emissions, 
scholars often advance suggestions that would mitigate emissions by 
improving technologies or intensifying production.208  
While mitigation efforts from improved technologies or improved 
feed-to-product ratios are potentially preferable to present policies, 
they are likely to prove insufficient.209 Even if technologies are 
improved such that production causes fewer greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of animal food product, the emissions will 
increase due to the predicted doubling of production of animal food 
products by 2050.210  
 
 207. See discussion supra Parts III.B, III.C (finding that U.S. agricultural 
subsidies violate the UNFCCC because the subsidies promote greenhouse gas 
emissions). 
 208. See, e.g., SMITH ET AL., supra note 77, at 510 (explaining how dietary 
additives aimed at suppressing methane production, selective breeding, and 
improved feed practices could help reduce emissions associated with livestock 
production); Jennifer A. Burney et al., Greenhouse Gas Mitigation By Agricultural 
Intensification, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12052, 12055 (2010) (asserting that 
“intensification,” or the increase of productivity of current agricultural lands, 
releases fewer greenhouse gases than would producing the same amount of 
agricultural products more conventionally on greater land areas). 
 209. See P. Gerber et al., Policy Options in Addressing Livestock’s Contribution 
to Climate Change, 4 ANIMAL 393 (2010) (arguing that mitigating technologies 
can play a crucial role in addressing climate change, but asserting that the greater 
challenge will be addressing livestock emissions in countries not obligated to abide 
by the UNFCCC). 
 210. STEINFIELD ET AL., supra note 76, at 275. See generally Burney et al., supra 
note 209 (establishing that the intensification of agriculture does not offset the 
greenhouse gases emitted by bringing new cropland into use). 
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Another potential solution is to tie subsidies to environmental 
incentives, such as shifting subsidies on conventionally produced 
corn or soy to organic products.211 However, these programs also 
create problems, including the creation of incentives for more 
farmers, across the globe, to increase production using subsidized 
technology, resulting in greater net global emissions.212 Tax 
incentives for reduced emissions are likewise problematic because 
they potentially pose problems from an international trade 
standpoint.213  
Other widely touted measures include emissions cap and trade 
systems, which assign emissions quota to producers but allow them 
to buy others’ surpluses to lawfully exceed their quotas.214 Thus, with 
a trading system, total emissions may only decrease modestly 
because producers can simply buy permission to emit in excess of 
their purported limits.215  
Any mechanism that would effectively mitigate emissions must 
impose accurate costs on production so that environmental costs are 
not unjustly borne by society.216 Removal of subsidies is the most 
effective way to ensure environmental costs are no longer 
externalized; this is because other means may inadvertently increase 
 
 211. See Annise Maguire, Shifting the Paradigm: Broadening Our 
Understanding of Agriculture and Its Impact on Climate Change, 33 ENVIRONS 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 275, 306-12 (2010) (recognizing, however, that shifting 
subsidies to organic farming would be a less comprehensive solution compared 
with other measures, such as all-inclusive legislation regulating agriculture). 
 212. See Henning Steinfeld & Pierre Geber, Livestock Production and the 
Global Environment: Consume Less or Produce Better?, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 18237-8 (2010) (discussing the potential for advanced technology to increase 
the efficiency of animal agriculture in developing nations where the demand for 
animal products is increasing). 
 213. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 187, 190 (establishing the principle of “national treatment,” that imported 
and locally-produced goods should be treated equally); see also Gerber et al., 
supra note 210, at 397, 403 (explaining that trade law requires that all ‘like’ 
products be taxed at the same rate, regardless of production method). 
 214. See Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 398-99 (noting that, because farmers 
who sell offsets receive higher profits, these programs create “an incentive for 
more farmers to increase production using the subsidized . . . technology.”). 
 215. See id. at 398. 
 216. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (elaborating on the problems of 
externalization of the costs of environmental degradation associated with animal 
agriculture). 
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emissions or are simply not aggressive enough.217 Further, because 
removing subsidies is feasible, the United States should strive to 
eliminate its subsidies on animal agriculture to the fullest extent 
possible.218  
The example of New Zealand illustrates that elimination of 
agricultural subsidies is not only possible, but that it can promote a 
healthy and strong agricultural industry.219 New Zealand has the 
lowest rate of agricultural support as a share of gross domestic 
product of any OECD country.220 In spite of this, New Zealand’s 
agricultural sector has enjoyed great sustainability in its agricultural 
sector.221  
B. STRENGTHEN THE UNFCCC WITH AN ENFORCEMENT 
MECHANISM AND GREATER BREADTH OF CONTROL 
 
A second possible remedy for the U.S. violation of the UNFCCC 
is to amend the UNFCCC in several ways; however it would be 
undeniably difficult to convince all of the nearly 200 parties to agree 
to any substantive amendments.222 Because the current reporting 
requirement of the UNFCCC has proven to be ineffective at pushing 
parties to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from animal agriculture, 
the UNFCCC should establish an enforcement authority that can 
impose economic sanctions rather that merely encourage voluntary 
 
 217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (explaining the deficiencies of a 
cap and trade system for incentivizing greenhouse gas mitigation where farmers 
trade credits to worse greenhouse gas emitters). 
 218. See discussion supra Part II.C (describing the role of agricultural subsidies 
in promoting greenhouse gas emissions); see also Stiglitz, supra note 126 
(discussing the harmful effects of subsidies on U.S. farmers and consumers, and 
arguing that the U.S. would serve its own interests by eliminating subsidies). Cf. 
Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 400 (using New Zealand as an example of a 
country that has successfully eliminated most agricultural subsidies). 
 219. See Gerber et al., supra note 210, at 400 (examining the success of a nearly 
subsidy free emissions trading program for New Zealand’s livestock farmers). 
 220. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN 
OECD COUNTRIES: MONITORING AND EVALUATION 2007 195-196 (2007) 
(reporting that, from 2004 to 2006, New Zealand had a .3% support rate for 
agriculture, significantly lower than that of the U.S.). 
 221. Id. at 195, 200. 
 222.  See Sanger, supra note 47, at 1 (noting the challenges of negotiating 
environmental standards between nations). 
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negotiations.223 Additionally, because economists are able to roughly 
quantify the cost per cubic ton of carbon dioxide, nations exceeding 
their quotas should be charged for their overage plus penalties.224  
While the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol currently make wide 
allowances for non-Annex I countries with respect to greenhouse gas 
emissions, there needs to be acknowledgement that in the near future, 
non-Annex I countries will be responsible for the majority of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.225 Because all parties that are major 
contributors to greenhouse gas emissions should be subject to the 
UNFCCC’s regulations, the definition of “Annex I” should be 
revised.226 Finally, because the Kyoto Protocol will expire in 2012, 
the UNFCCC should be amended to require that each of its parties 
adopt the successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol.227 This would 
ensure that stubborn parties, like the United States, could be 
compelled to undertake binding obligations even if such 
commitments are politically unpopular.228  
V. CONCLUSION 
As a signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the United States is obligated to abide by the 
commitments contained therein.229 Central to the UNFCCC is the 
goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions from human-caused 
sources so that dangerous changes in climate, resulting from the 
 
 223. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 4(1)(a) (requiring that parties make 
available inventories of national anthropogenic emissions “of all greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol…”); see also id. art. 14 (calling for 
negotiation between convention parties in the event of a dispute about the 
UNFCCC’s terms or application). 
 224. See Tegtmeir & Duffy, supra note 90, at 10 (noting that the market price 
per cubic ton of carbon dioxide equivalents was $0.98 in 2003, based on the 
Chicago Climate Exchange). 
 225. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing 
significance of emissions by China, India, and Brazil). 
 226. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, at 4(1) (explaining the relative responsibilities 
of Annex I and non-Annex I parties). 
 227. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (illustrating the significance of the 
imminent expiry of the Kyoto Protocol). 
 228. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (demonstrating the original reasons why 
the United States refused to be bound to the Kyoto Protocol). 
 229. See discussion supra Part III.A (explaining that the UNFCCC language is 
binding, and therefore that the United States is bound to the commitments set forth 
in Article 4). 
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buildup of atmosphere-warming gases, can be avoided.230 However, 
the United States currently disregards the UNFCCC’s mandates to 
review domestic policies that encourage emissions and to attempt to 
reduce national gas emissions to 1990 levels.231 Of particular concern 
is the fact that the United States continues to subsidize animal 
agriculture, even in the face of evidence that subsidies encourage 
greenhouse gas emissions.232 By offering high levels of farmer 
income support, safety nets, and reduced-price resources for the 
production of animal food products, the United States encourages the 
expansion and overproduction of animal food products, thus 
contributing to climate change in disregard of the UNFCCC.233  
The United States faces a fresh opportunity to take meaningful 
steps to reduce its culpability in climate change by binding itself to 
concrete emissions targets upon the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol.234 
If it chooses to do so, the United States can amend the policies of its 
agricultural sector, which presents tremendous room for progress, 
and bring itself into compliance with the UNFCCC while restoring 
its credibility as a leader in climate change mitigation.235 Finally, as 
one of the world’s top greenhouse gas emitters, the United States 
needs to comply with the UNFCCC in order to help avoid the harsh 
consequences of accelerated global warming.  
 
 
 230. See UNFCCC, supra note 8, art. 2 (expressing that the objective of the 
UNFCCC is to thwart possible adverse consequences from human-induced climate 
change). 
 231. See id. arts. 4(1)-(2); see also discussion supra Part II.C (linking the 
subsidization of animal agriculture to an increase in demand for practices that 
encourage greenhouse gas emissions). 
 232. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C (providing background information on 
the role of animal agriculture in global warming and the economic mechanisms 
which incentivize production in animal agriculture). 
 233. See id. 
 234. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the upcoming expiration 
of the Kyoto Protocol will undo internationally binding emissions limits unless the 
Kyoto Protocol is extended or a new agreement is reached). 
 235. See CNN Wire Staff, Obama Says Laws Must be Updated After Oil 
Disaster, CNN (June 10, 2010), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/politics/06/10/ 
obama.gulf.spill/index.html (showing that Obama believes the United States needs 
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